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Abstract
This paper examines definitions of production boundaries in economics, explores the limitations of these
definitions with respect to the inclusion of unpaid domestic labor, and considers the significance of such
an exploration for feminist economic analysis. Margaret Reid's ''third party criterion,'' a definition of
economic activity advocated by many feminists and one used to set the production boundary for most
household production models, sets an implicit market standard for defining nonmarket economic activity
and therefore contributes to the marginalization of such production. Similarly, production boundaries
considered appropriate in third world contexts, such as those defined in the recently revised System of
National Accounts, also use implicit market standards for defining nonmarket economic activity. A ''first
world'' criterion implicit in such production boundaries defines nonmarket activity as work only if it 
would have been dealt with on the market in the first world; this results in the inclusion of some of the 
unpaid domestic activity of rural women on grounds which reinforce the exclusion of work such as child 
care and the preparation of meals in theory and policy. Feminist economists should beware the danger of
recreating implicit assumptions and definitions which result in the exclusion of unpaid domestic labor.
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It is by now a central tenet of feminist economics that unpaid domestic labor (housework or household 
production) is not accorded the status of an economic activity in mainstream economic theory, nor is it 
incorporated in any meaningful way into mainstream economic analysis. Recent work addressing this 
issue by feminist critics of mainstream economics such as Marilyn Waring, Lourdes Benería and Susan 
Himmelweit has concentrated on how traditional definitions of economic activity exclude some or all 
unpaid domestic labor. The implications of this work are as significant for feminist theory as for policy, 
since they suggest that incorporating unpaid domestic labor into new definitions of economic activity does 
not necessarily achieve feminist goals; how such labor is incorporated must be examined closely for 
implicit masculinist assumptions and categories of analysis. 
 
In this article, I analyze the exclusion of unpaid domestic labor through an examination of the “third party 
criterion,” a widely accepted definition of economic activity in household production models as well as in 
the System of National Accounts (SNA). I find that the third party criterion not only relies on market 
standards for defining unpaid domestic activity as work, but also requires that it be possible for nonmarket 
work to be delegated. This supports Susan Himmelweit‟s recent analysis of “separability” in her 
discussion of unpaid work (Himmelweit 1995). It also suggests that, while Regenia Gagnier and John 
Dupré are right to argue that we should explore the many diverse conceptions of work, it is still vital to 
analyze the “restricted” definitions underlying economic theory if we are to understand the limitations of 
national income accounts, the measurement of household production, and policy based on the imputation 
of unpaid work (see Gagnier and Dupré 1995: 103). Using the current version of the System of 
National Accounts, I show that existing definitions of work and housework in such restricted contexts are 
modeled on first world economies, with interesting (if problematic) results for the treatment of third world 
women‟s labor in both mainstream and feminist economics. Overall, I find an overriding exclusion of the 
personal, which operates even when inconsistent with the proposed definition of economic activity. 
 
Just as Marilyn Waring did in If Women Counted (1988), I base my analysis of the exclusion of unpaid 
domestic labor on an examination of “production boundaries.” Production boundaries are most familiar to 
economists and statisticians working with national income accounts and other surveys of economic 
activity – they specify exactly what will be counted and what will be excluded in such surveys (see Derek 
Blades 1975: 45). Broadly understood, however, the term refers to the conceptual distinction between 
“economic” and “noneconomic” which defines the legitimate terrain of economic analysis. As Gagnier and 
Dupré suggest, there are richer conceptions of work than those allowed by definitions of production 
boundaries, especially those positing work as the opposite of ease and self-fulfillment (Gagnier and 
Dupré 1995). Nevertheless, most policy is based on such definitions, as are household production models 
which dominate theoretical discussions of women‟s unpaid work in economics. 
 
Waring‟s book criticizes mainstream treatments of unpaid domestic labor in the context of analyzing 
national income accounts and the theoretical assumptions on which they are based. Like most feminist 
critics of mainstream economics, Waring focuses on the centering of the market and market-oriented 
activities as the major determinant of the exclusion of housework from definitions of economic activity. 
Using the 1968 United Nations System of National Accounts, she argues that mainstream economics in 
general assumes a strict market criterion for determining what is economic: the discipline “excludes the 
household from its system of valuation because it is not part of the market” (Waring 1988: 37). Production 
boundaries defined by this strict market standard necessarily exclude unpaid domestic labor. 
 
But what about production boundaries that incorporate nonmarket forms of work? Waring herself 
suggests Margaret Reid‟s third party criterion as an alternative de. nition of economic activity which 
incorporates unpaid domestic labor, a position recently reiterated by Lourdes Benería (Waring 
1988: 26; Benería 1992: 1552). The newly revised System of National Accounts (SNA 1993) now 
incorporates a broad range of nonmarket activities, suggesting the need to revisit terrain Waring has 
already explored. As I will show, each of these production boundaries does away with strict market 
criteria for defining economic activity, but nevertheless continues to exclude all or some unpaid domestic 
labor. 
 
Susan Himmelweit recently complicated the theoretical analysis of unpaid work in this journal (1995), by 
arguing that feminist analysis must not be based on an uncritical acceptance of existing definitions of 
work if masculinist biases implicit in such definitions are not to be reproduced. Himmelweit identifies the 
implicit requirement that an activity be separable from the worker for it to qualify as work. This 
requirement results in the exclusion of certain forms of caring and self-fulfilling activities feminists are 
likely to want included. That traditional definitions of work assumed in economics are modeled on the 
wage-earning production of commodities, as Himmelweit suggests, implies that the centering of the 
market can occur in more subtle forms than the explicit exclusion of nonmarket activities. This implication 
is central to the following analysis of production boundaries in discussions of household labor. 
 
 
II. THE THIRD PARTY CRITERION 
 
Since strict market definitions of economic activity necessarily exclude unpaid domestic labor, as Waring 
and others have pointed out, the incorporation of such labor into economic analysis cannot occur without 
developing alternative production boundaries that distinguish economic from noneconomic activity on 
some basis other than whether or not the activity is performed for money. But this is not an easy task, 
even in the context of the household. Of all the activities which occur there, from sex to child care to 
washing dishes, which should be considered economic in function and which not? 
 
This question has been addressed to some degree in discussions of household production and 
alternatives to conventional national income accounts (Oli Hawrylyshyn 1976, 1977; Luisella 
Goldschmidt-Clermont 1982, 1987; Robert Eisner 1989; F. Thomas Juster and Frank Stafford 1991: 504 
10).1 The definition of economic activity in the household most commonly offered in this literature is 
based (implicitly or explicitly) on some variation of the third party criterion, first suggested by Margaret 
Reid in Economics of Household Production (Goldschmidt-Clermont 1987: 5; Juster and Stafford 1991: 
505). According to Reid, 
 
[i]f an activity is of such character that it might be delegated to a paid worker, then that activity    
shall be deemed productive. . . . [H]ousehold production . . . consists of those unpaid activities 
which are carried on, by and for the members, which activities might be replaced by market 
goods, or paid services, if circumstances such as income, market conditions, and personal 
inclinations permit the service being delegated to someone outside the household group. 
(Reid 1934: 11, italics omitted) 
 
The use of the third party criterion to define economic activity is unquestioned in economic evaluations of 
unpaid household work, including those developed by feminists; its wide acceptance is considered 
justification enough for its continued use (for example, see Goldschmidt-Clermont 1987: 5). Both Marilyn 
Waring and Lourdes Benería offer the third party criterion as a positive alternative to production 
boundaries defined in the System of National Accounts (see Waring 1988: 26; Benería 1992: 1552). 
But there are serious theoretical concerns for a feminist practice of economics which are raised by 
defining the production boundary in these terms. 
 
The primary problem with the third party criterion from a feminist perspective is that, while it does not rely 
on a strict market definition of economic activity, it nevertheless assumes the market as the model of 
economic activity. According to this criterion, if and only if an activity in the household has some 
commodity equivalent will it be considered economic. The commodity thus becomes the norm or standard 
for defining economic activity, and the “economicness” of a given household activity is determined by the 
degree to which it reflects characteristics of activities or products on the market. But if a household activity 
is economic only to the degree it resembles a commodity, then to the degree it does not resemble a 
commodity (e.g. it is not bought, it is not paid), it is somehow less economic, even when it has some 
market equivalent. Incorporated into economic analysis in these terms, unpaid domestic labor can only be 
marginalized.2 
 
The third party criterion‟s market-based definition of the production boundary also precludes the existence 
of economic activity unique to the household, since anything which does not, or does not yet, have a 
commodity equivalent cannot be considered economic.3 While this may primarily be a conceptual 
problem in highly-commoditized economies, it is one which contributes to the theoretical marginalization 
of unpaid domestic labor, again because it requires us to look first to the market before we define 
household economic activity. A market criterion for defining the economic, however indirect, also leads to 
shifting production boundaries as the economy becomes more commoditized. Before the introduction of 
paid surrogate motherhood, for example, pregnancy and childbirth would not be considered economic 
according to the third party criterion. However, the day surrogate motherhood became a commodity, 
unpaid pregnancy and childbirth should also have been considered economic. 
 
As Waring has pointed out, unpaid childbirth is rarely considered an economic activity (Waring 1988: 27–
8). That this is true even in feminist attempts to evaluate unpaid domestic labor suggests another difficulty 
with the third party criterion, at least in how it has been applied: it is almost always used inconsistently, so 
that certain “private” activities which in fact have market equivalents are excluded. Almost all economic 
analyses or evaluations of unpaid domestic labor will include such activities as washing clothes, preparing 
meals and child care since, if the household had the income or the inclination, it could pay a housekeeper 
or daycare center to do them. By the same token, emotional caretaking, sex and childbirth should also be 
defined as economic, since there are paid workers who engage in similar activities – therapist, prostitute, 
surrogate mother. Yet such activities are uniformly excluded from economic analyses of the household, 
even those which explicitly use the third party criterion to define the production boundary (see 
Goldschmidt-Clermont 1982, 1987; John Devereux and Luis Locay 1992). Even though the exclusion of 
such “personal” activities from definitions of the production boundary violates the logic of the third party 
criterion, they are nevertheless excluded, and no substantive basis for this exclusion is offered in the 
contemporary literature (in those few cases when it is remarked upon at all). 
 
It is useful to return to Margaret Reid at this point, since her analysis illustrates simultaneously the 
subtlety possible in a discussion of production boundaries and the frailty of arguments for excluding the 
personal from conceptualizations of the economic. Reid devotes an entire chapter of Economics of 
Household Production to defining household production. Central to her argument for the third party 
criterion is the assertion that it must be possible for an activity to be delegated for it to be defined as 
economic. It is the possibility of delegation which distinguishes production from consumption, she argues; 
an activity which must be performed by the person herself in order to create satisfaction or utility for 
herself (such as “playing the piano as a means of self-expression, or swimming to satisfy one‟s desire 
for activity”) is not an economic activity (Reid 1934: 10).4 This concept is equivalent to the “separability” 
requirement which Himmelweit argues is implicit in traditional definitions of work and results in the 
exclusion of caring and self-fulfilling activities in the home (see Himmelweit 1995: 8). Reid‟s discussion 
provides insight and confirmation of much of Himmelweit‟s discussion, but suggests some need for 
revision. 
 
In addition to self-fulfilling activities such as swimming and playing the piano, Reid suggests that there is 
another category of unpaid activity in the home which cannot be delegated, in this case because the utility 
it produces derives in part from personal relationships: 
 
An activity is considered personal if it must be performed by a particular person not because of 
special ability but because of a personal relationship between the performer and the one whose 
want is satisfied. The relationships of husband and wife, of brother and sister, and of friends call 
for certain activities and result in satisfactions that do not arise from the performance alone but 
from the fact that the service is rendered by a particular person. 
(Reid 1934: 11) 
 
Here the activity cannot be delegated, not because it cannot be performed by one person for another, but 
because it must be performed by a particular person for another, with this particularity defined in terms of 
the personal. 
 
Reid makes an important distinction here which is relevant to Himmelweit‟s analysis. A personal 
relationship between the performer of an unpaid household activity and its beneficiary does not 
necessarily mean that the activity in its entirety is noneconomic (Reid 1934: 11–16). All tasks performed 
by a mother for her child, for example, are not in Reid‟s view unproductive because the mother does 
them. The child derives a certain amount of utility simply from having a clean diaper or a full stomach, 
regardless of who changed or fed her. What Reid wants to de. ne as separate from household production 
and therefore noneconomic is that excess or surplus utility the child gains from the mother herself 
performing such chores. 
 
Even if we accept Reid‟s argument, a consistent application of her approach should not require the 
exclusion of personal activities such as emotional caretaking, sex and childbirth from definitions of the 
economic. That people can and do buy any one of these as a commodity is evidence that not all aspects 
of utility deriving from those activities depend on who does them. A production boundary that excludes 
those aspects of such activities which are productive of “impersonal utility” thus remains problematic even 
in the context of Reid‟s analysis. 
 
Ultimately, however, Reid‟s justification for the exclusion of the personal aspects of these activities is 
suspect as well. She offers no argument for this exclusion other than that they are personal: “It seems 
that production is something apart from activities having to do with purely personal relationships” (Reid 
1934: 11). Feminist theory has problematized public/private distinctions enough that we clearly should 
question this move. Considering the possibility that the personal should be included in our definition of the 
economic allows for alternative analyses. For example, the “personal utility” a child derives from her 
mother‟s care could be seen as the product of a highly specialized and skilled worker.5 
 
In any case, as Himmelweit points out, there are certainly market exchanges which depend upon 
personal relationships, relationships which may translate into higher prices for the product sold 
(Himmelweit 1995: 9). This could be an argument for the inclusion of personal aspects of some 
household activities which would be consistent with variations of the third party criterion with less 
stringent delegability requirements. However, if there is anything about a mother‟s care for her child (or 
any other personal service in the household) which cannot be marketed but which nevertheless results in 
utility, this would seem to be an argument against a third party criterion for defining the economic rather 
than a justification for the exclusion of the personal aspects of unpaid domestic activity from economic 
analysis. There may be other arguments for excluding certain household activities or aspects of those 
activities from our conceptualization of the economic, but they will have to be made on some stronger 
basis than that they are “personal” or “private.” Nor can these arguments rely on the market to define 
economic activity, even indirectly, if they are not to beg the question of why the market should be used for 
such a purpose. 
 
In Himmelweit‟s terms, we must transform the definition of work such that the delegability (or separability) 
requirement is eliminated if we want to include caring labor. Feminists must take care in the process of 
redefinition that they do not recreate problematic categories. Reid‟s analysis highlights what is implicit in 
Himmelweit‟s argument that to be included in traditional definitions of work “there must be sufficient 
separation between the worker and her work” (Himmelweit 1995: 6, my emphasis). The question of 
separability does not have to be posited in either/or terms. Reid accepts diaper-changing as an economic 
activity even when the mother does it because it is close to being separable. Similarly, feminists who 
“discovered” unpaid work did so by stretching the traditional de. nition so that it included labor that was 
almost if not completely separable. Activities which were “less” separable, which produce a higher degree 
of “personal utility,” such as sex or emotional caretaking, could not be incorporated in this stretched 
definition, especially when reinforced by the conception of work articulated by Gagnier and Dupré as the 
opposite of ease and self-fulfillment (1995). In redefining work, then, feminists should be careful not to 
produce a diluted separability requirement if it is not their intention to suggest that we should dispense 
with the whole idea of defining activities themselves as work or nonwork, and discuss instead aspects of 
those activities, e.g. aspects of sex are economic in that they reproduce workers, even while they are also 
self-fulfilling; or, as Gagnier and Dupré argue, we should tease out the positive strands already existing in 
traditional definitions of work (as self-fulfilling, etc.) in developing alternatives. 
 
Restatements of the third party criterion do not differ substantively from Reid‟s, but their variations further 
illustrate themes I have discussed above. According to Oli Hawrylyshyn, for example: 
 
An economic service (or Z activity) is one which may be done by someone other than the person 
benefiting therefrom. The question can be asked; can one hire labour to achieve the same 
results? If yes, then the activity is one which produces Z-goods; if not, the activity is a direct utility 
one and cannot be measured in any meaningful way. 
(Hawrylyshyn 1977: 87, italics omitted) 
 
The delegability requirement reappears here but is quickly superseded by a market criterion for defining 
the production boundary, one which precludes the existence of economic activity unique to the household 
and which marginalizes unpaid domestic labor by situating market activity as the exemplar of the 
economic. Although Hawrylyshyn notices the inconsistency of excluding sex from production boundaries 
based on this criterion, he raises this concern only to dismiss it: 
 
To respond immediately to the inevitable jokes about market replaceability for conjugal relations, 
let it be said that of course one can find a market alternative price for sex in dollar terms, but this 
has little relation to, and does not change the fact that the price of love is, well, love. 
(Hawrylyshyn 1977: 87) 
 
Like Reid, Hawrylyshyn perceives his invocation of the personal as sufficient condition for the exclusion of 
a household activity from definitions of the economic, despite the implicit requirement of his own criterion 
that it be included. A production boundary excluding the personal is therefore posited as prior to the 
boundary defined by the third party criterion; in the event of conflict, exclusion of the personal dominates. 
 
F. Thomas Juster and Frank Stafford also repeat Reid‟s definition of production, with leisure occupying 
the position of consumption: 
 
A household production activity is defined as one where a third party could be paid to produce the 
output, while a leisure time activity is defined as one in which third-party production is 
conceptually impossible – e.g. attending the theater, playing sports, watching television, or sleep. 
      ( Juster and Stafford 1991: 505) 
 
Again, the possibility of economic activity unique to the household is precluded by this de. nition, and 
while sex, childbirth and emotional caretaking should not be excluded by it, these activities are never 
mentioned in Juster and Stafford‟s discussions of unpaid domestic labor. The priority of excluding the 
personal is implicit in their analysis, but it is there nevertheless. The delegability requirement only 
reinforces this exclusion. 
 
In summary, the third party criterion for defining economic activity in the household marginalizes unpaid 
domestic labor not only in setting forth an indirect market standard for defining economic activity but also 
in the assertion of a delegability requirement. Both these criteria privilege public over private to some 
degree, but the pattern of their inconsistent use reveals that there is another household production 
boundary which requires exclusion of the personal. This implicit criterion takes precedence in cases 
where consistency should require the inclusion of certain private marketable activities. Combined with the 
delegability requirement, such a production boundary does not allow for the definition of any personal 
activity as economic. 
 
 
III. THIRD WORLD PRODUCTION BOUNDARIES 
 
a. The third party criterion revisited 
 
The production boundary considered applicable in third world contexts has been debated in terms similar 
to those used to de. ne household production. 6 While “development” is still used in mainstream analysis 
to refer to an overall enlargement of the market in third world economies, defining the production 
boundary strictly in market terms is no longer considered adequate, particularly for national income 
accounts. It is generally not unpaid domestic labor which is the focus of concern in these debates when 
framed by mainstream economists, but rather noncommodity subsistence activities such as agriculture for 
household consumption or the construction of homes. However, expanding the production boundary to 
include subsistence activities requires a nonmarket definition of the economic; discussions of what this 
definition should be are thus directly relevant to my own exploration of the production boundary, 
particularly since official analysis of the problem explicitly rejects the inclusion of unpaid domestic labor. 
 
To review material discussed in Waring, official analysis of the production boundary is articulated most 
clearly in the System of National Accounts (SNA), a product of the United Nations with recent 
contributions by international agencies such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. 
Originally formulated in 1953, the SNA “has become the standard, or universal, system used with little or 
no modification by most countries of the world for their own national purposes” (Inter-Secretariat Working 
Group on National Accounts 1993: 8). That is, national income accounts throughout the world, including 
now those of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, are or will be based on the guidelines set forth 
by the System. The SNA thus determines what statistics are gathered for purposes 
 opinion among mainstream economists on how the production boundary should be defined, and this 
definition must be stated very explicitly if the SNA is to serve its function. It is useful for my analysis, as it 
was for Waring, not only because it is representative and explicit but also because over the years the 
appropriateness of the SNA to third world economies has been a matter of serious debate and a major 
motivation for revision of the System. In its most recent revision, SNA 1993, it also addresses at some 
length the exclusion of unpaid domestic labor. This revision of the SNA supplants the 1968 version that 
Waring analyzes in If Women Counted. 
 
SNA 1993 defines a “general” production boundary which is in effect a variation of the third party criterion, 
with both an indirect market standard for defining economic activity and a delegability requirement: 
 
In the System, production is understood to be a physical process, carried out under the 
responsibility, control and management of an institutional unit, in which labour and assets are 
used to transform inputs of goods and services into outputs of other goods and services. 
All goods and services produced as outputs must be such that they can be sold on markets or at 
least be capable of being provided by one unit to another, with or without charge. . . . The main 
problem for defining the range of activities recorded in the production accounts . . . is to decide 
upon the treatment of activities that produce goods and services that could have been supplied to 
others on the market but are actually retained by their producers for their own use. 
(Inter-Secretariat Working Group on National Accounts 1993: 4) Later the SNA states that there is 
a “need to confine the production boundary . . . to market activities or fairly close substitutes for 
market activities” 
   (Inter-Secretariat Working Group on National Accounts 1993: 5). 
 
Just as in Reid‟s third party criterion, the SNA‟s assertion of direct and indirect market standards for 
defining economic activity necessarily marginalizes noncommodity activities such as unpaid domestic 
labor or subsistence agriculture even as it revises the production boundary to include them. Only because 
of their close resemblance to market labor or production are such activities defined as economic; they 
have no independent status. Again, this criterion does not allow for economic activities unique to 
nonmarket settings such as households. 
 
At the same time, the delegability requirement, meant to exclude activities such as eating and sleeping, 
also serves to exclude personal aspects of activities newly defined as economic. According to the SNA, 
“activities such as washing, preparing meals, caring for children, the sick or aged are all activities that can 
be provided by other units and, therefore, fall within the general production boundary” (Inter-Secretariat 
Working Group on National Accounts 1993: 124). By extension, if there are aspects of these services 
which cannot be delegated because they are dependent on the person doing them, then such activities 
will not be considered economic. And activities such as childbirth, sex and emotional caretaking are not 
included in the list of domestic work which falls within the general production boundary, despite the fact 
that each could be performed by one unit for the benefit of another. The SNA‟s delegability requirement, 
like Reid‟s, thus precludes the possibility of personal economic activity. 
 
Because it is based on a third party criterion very similar to Reid‟s, the general production boundary 
defined by SNA 1993 is similarly problematic with respect to unpaid domestic labor. Despite this, a 
consistent application of the SNA‟s criterion would define the majority of such labor as economic. 
There is room for optimism, perhaps, in the explicit acknowledgment of this by the authors of the current 
System, who include activities such as child care and meal preparation in their definition of the general 
production boundary (Inter-Secretariat Working Group on National Accounts 
1993: 124, quoted above). 
 
Unfortunately, this general production boundary is revised somewhat for purposes of the SNA itself: 
 
The production boundary in the System is more restricted than the general production boundary. . 
. . [P]roduction accounts are not compiled for household activities that produce domestic or 
personal services for own final consumption within the same household, except for services 
produced by employing paid domestic staff. Otherwise, the production boundary in the System is 
the same as the more general one. . . . 
(Inter-Secretariat Working Group on National Accounts 1993: 124) 
 
In other words, activities such as washing, preparing meals, etc., are excluded in the actual SNA 
guidelines for gathering statistics, even though these activities are defined as economic in the general 
production boundary. They are also the only nonmarket activities to be so excluded. The justification for 
this exclusion is revealing: 
 
[T]he reluctance of national accountants to impute values for the outputs, incomes and 
expenditures associated with the production and consumption of domestic and personal services 
within households is explained by a combination of factors, namely the relative isolation and 
independence of these activities from markets, the extreme difficulty of making economically 
meaningful estimates of their values, and the adverse effects it would have on the usefulness of 
the accounts for policy purposes and the analysis of markets and market disequilibria – the 
analysis of inflation, unemployment, etc. . . . 
(Inter-Secretariat Working Group on National Accounts 1993: 125) 
 
A strong reassertion of market criteria for defining the legitimate terrain of economic analysis dominates 
this statement. Isolation and independence of unpaid domestic labor from markets is only reason for its 
exclusion if economic activity is defined strictly in market terms. Measurement difficulties are not 
insurmountable unless, as is the case here, “economically meaningful” refers to actual market prices. 
Prices are currently imputed for the value of subsistence production and for the rental value of owner-
occupied property, and similar imputations for unpaid domestic labor are certainly possible, once 
controversy over what conventions to apply are dealt with.7 Finally, including such labor in the accounts 
can only have “adverse effects” on policy if policy and policy evaluation are confined to markets. 
 
Considerable evidence exists that domestic activities are in fact not independent or isolated from markets; 
the literature on gender and policies for structural adjustment, for example, suggests both that unpaid 
domestic labor is affected by market changes, sometimes dramatically, and that changes in such labor 
are at least partially responsible for the “success” of such policies as measured by traditional market 
indicators (see Commonwealth Secretariat 1989; Diane Elson 1989, 1991, 1992; UNICEF 1989). In any 
case, since such labor has never been measured or analyzed in any consistent way, on what basis do the 
SNA‟s authors assert its relationship to markets? 
 
Even if all of the concerns stated in the SNA with respect to the measurement of unpaid domestic labor 
were valid, such measurement would not be problematic if separate statistics were kept for the purpose of 
analyzing markets. But the arguments explored above are used to justify the complete exclusion of such 
labor from the System‟s production boundary; market criteria for defining economic activity are thus 
reinforced, despite the SNA‟s positive statements on the economic status of unpaid activity in the home. 
 
Analysis of SNA 1993 suggests that Lourdes Benería is optimistic in her recent assertion that 
“[c]onceptually at least, the battle against the invisibility of women‟s work seems to have largely been 
won” (Benería 1992: 1551). It is true that branches of the United Nations system and other development 
agencies have actively promoted the revision of national accounts to better measure all aspects of 
women‟s work, including unpaid domestic labor. But the new definition of economic activity resulting from 
such efforts is, as Benería herself points out, still very much market-centered, and is in fact another 
version of the third party criterion: production, in these terms, is “the creation of goods and services which 
are exchanged on the market, are capable of being marketed or are produced with factors of production 
bought in the market” (quoted in Benería 1992: 1552). While Benería argues that “the predominance of 
market-related rather than welfare-related criteria tends to place domestic production in a special 
category of work” (Benería 1992: 1552), the analysis I have presented here suggests that market criteria, 
even when indirect, bring about the exclusion of unpaid domestic activity from definitions of work. That 
Benería explicitly approves of the third party criterion as a principle for defining household economic 
activity, and does so because it “makes clear that market-related criteria are also applicable to the 
accounting of domestic work” (Benería 1992: 1552) shows that she does not fully recognize this 
mechanism of exclusion. 
 
Just as in household production models, the exclusion of unpaid domestic labor in the SNA results most 
directly from an inconsistent application of the third party criterion in defining the production boundary 
relevant to third world economies. An implicit market criterion as well as a delegability requirement is used 
to justify the inclusion of nonmarket subsistence activities such as agriculture for own use and home 
construction in the actual production boundary used by the System while simultaneously excluding unpaid 
domestic labor – most of which has some market equivalent. Though the “general production boundary” 
described by the SNA is more consistent, it would nevertheless exclude personal activities and aspects of 
such activities on the basis of the delegability requirement and what I have described above as an implicit 
and dominant criterion for defining economic activity that requires the exclusion of the personal. 
 
 
b. The first world/third party criterion 
 
Many third world women perform a broader range of work as part of their unpaid household 
responsibilities than is generally the case for women in the first world. In rural areas of the third world, for 
example, women may travel long distances to and from their homes in order to haul water or collect fuel; 
building houses may also be women‟s work. In addition, work such as processing and cooking food or 
washing clothes may be much more time-consuming than a similar activity would be in the . rst world. 
Having tortillas for dinner may involve grinding grain for hours a day. To get a chicken to the table for a 
special occasion, a third world woman might have to raise the chicken, kill it and pluck it in addition to 
whatever preparation a first world woman would undertake. 
 
It is important to consider these differences in women‟s unpaid work in a discussion of production 
boundaries because not all such work is excluded even from those definitions of economic activity which 
explicitly exclude domestic labor. The basis for distinguishing economic from noneconomic in this case is 
revealing: production boundaries developed for third world economies exclude only those aspects of 
women‟s household activities which mirror unpaid domestic labor in the first world. According to the SNA, 
for example, “[t]he following types of production by households are . . . included whether intended for own 
final consumption or not”: 
 
(a) The production of agricultural products and their subsequent storage; the gathering of berries 
or other uncultivated crops; forestry; wood-cutting and the collection of firewood; hunting and 
fishing; 
(b) The production of other primary products such as mining salt, cutting peat, the supply of 
water, etc; 
(c) The processing of agricultural products; the production of grain by threshing; the production of 
flour by milling; the curing of skins and the production of leather; the production and preservation 
of meat and fish products; the preservation of fruit by drying, bottling, etc.; the production of dairy 
products such as butter or cheese; the production of beer, wine, or spirits; the production of 
baskets or mats; etc.; 
(d) Other kinds of processing such as weaving cloth; dress making and tailoring; the production of 
footwear; the production of pottery, utensils or durables; making furniture or furnishings, etc. 
(Inter-Secretariat Working Group on National Accounts 1993: 125) 
 
Especially when unpaid and done for the household‟s “own consumption,” most of these activities are 
women‟s work in a significant number of third world contexts, but are rarely performed by first world 
women. 
 
Compare this with the SNA‟s list of “those domestic and personal services for which no entries are 
recorded in the accounts when they are produced and consumed within the same household”: 
 
(a) The cleaning, decoration and maintenance of the dwelling occupied by the household, 
including small repairs . . . ; 
(b) The cleaning, servicing and repair of household durables or other goods . . . ; 
(c) The preparation and serving of meals; 
(d) The care, training and instruction of children; 
(e) The care of sick, in.rm or old people; 
(f) The transportation of members of the household or their goods. 
(Inter-Secretariat Working Group on National Accounts 1993: 124) 
 
These activities make up the bulk of women‟s unpaid domestic labor in the first world; of the unpaid work 
first world women do which is not on the list (shopping, for example), almost all would surely be added or 
considered part of one of the excluded categories if presented to the authors of the SNA. Such activities 
are also part of the unpaid domestic labor of third world women, and for some may comprise all of the 
unpaid work they do. For many, however, this work makes up only part of their unpaid household labor, 
but only this part is excluded from definitions of economic activity. 
  
The SNA argues that the distinction is one of goods vs. services: 
 
The System . . . includes all production of goods for own use within its production boundary, as 
goods can be switched between market and non-market use even after they have been 
produced, but it excludes all production of services for own final consumption within households. . 
. . These services are consumed as they are produced and the links between their production and 
market activities are more tenuous than for goods production, such as agricultural goods which 
households may produce partly for own final consumption and partly for sale, or barter, on the 
market. 
(Inter-Secretariat Working Group on National Accounts 1993: 5) 
 
There is an obvious reimposition of market criteria for defining economic activity here; it must be possible 
for the product to be sold for it to be considered economic. The privileging of goods over services also 
exemplified in the SNA‟s remarks is another tendency in mainstream economic theory which contributes 
to the marginalization of unpaid domestic labor since so much of the product of such labor is nonmaterial 
and “consumed as it is produced” (see Cynthia Wood 1994: 41–4). And because a service in the home is 
generally done for a known person, the exclusion of services “for own final consumption” by the 
household is intertwined with the exclusion of the personal. 
 
The SNA‟s explanation of the exclusion of services is also problematic because the basis for 
distinguishing goods and services remains unclear and arbitrary. Why is hauling water the production of a 
good, but cooking a meal is a service? There are many meals prepared in third world contexts which are 
meant partly for the market and partly for home consumption. Is the distinction to be made based on 
whether the meal is primarily intended for the market so that “leftovers” are consumed at home, or it is 
primarily meant for home consumption, and leftovers are for sale? If a meal is cooked with some idea of 
how much will be marketed and how much will be consumed, is only part of the labor involved in 
producing that meal excluded? How much? There is surely a large percentage of water hauled which is 
meant exclusively for home consumption, with the “possibility” of selling the water no more important to 
the person doing the work than its use in washing clothes or caring for children. Why is this process 
considered a good rather than the transportation of a good, which is explicitly excluded? 
 
These questions suggest that the SNA‟s distinction between good and service and the exclusion of the 
latter are based on something other than the argument presented. That something is an implicit “first 
world” third party criterion, market-based but defined by first world experience. In Non-Monetary 
(Subsistence) Activities in the National Accounts of Developing Countries, Derek Blades summarizes his 
discussion of how to draw the nonmonetary production boundary as follows: 
 
  [T]he production boundary should encompass non-monetary activities 
which are likely to be replaced by monetary activities as an economy becomes more specialized. 
(Blades 1975: 54)8 
 
Indirectly, Blades is setting first world economies as models for defining the nonmonetary production 
boundary since they are the most monetized at this time. How else are we to know what is “most likely” to 
be replaced by monetary activities without looking at historical precedent? Other national accountants are 
more explicit. Marilyn Waring summarizes the views of the statistician responsible for setting up the 
national income accounts in Nepal on this issue: 
 
[I]n industrial countries, the major part of food processing, fuel and water collection, and home 
construction is performed outside the household and, hence, are considered income-generating 
activities. The fact that these same activities are performed within the household in Nepal and 
other developing countries is not sufficient reason for excluding them from the definition of 
economic activities. 
(Waring 1988: 113) 
 
In defining a production boundary to include certain nonmonetary activities in the third world as economic 
because they are monetary activities in the first world, the first world/third party criterion also excludes 
certain aspects of women‟s unpaid household labor. Since women‟s unpaid domestic labor in the . rst 
world lies outside the production boundary defined by national income accounts, and since the first world 
is constructed as the model for development, household work in the third world which looks like unpaid 
domestic labor in the first world cannot be considered economic or counted as part of the nonmarket 
subsistence sector of the economy. According to the first world/third party criterion, what makes 
noncommodity or subsistence activities (marginally) “economic” is that they would have been dealt with 
on the market had the economy in question been a fully developed (i.e. first world) economy. Certain 
aspects of women‟s unpaid household labor in the third world fulfill this requirement, such as house-
building and gathering fuel, and are therefore counted. But those aspects of household labor in the third 
world which would have been performed as unpaid work by women in the first world are excluded by this 
production boundary. Of course, the third party criterion is as always applied inconsistently since it is 
certainly possible to find monetary examples of these activities. 
 
The fact that many of the labors of poor rural women in the third world arbitrary nature of distinctions used 
to situate one as economic and another as noneconomic. Such a woman‟s household duties might 
include producing food, processing it for consumption, hauling water, collecting firewood and caring for 
her children. According to the first world/third party criterion, the work of growing crops or raising animals 
for household consumption is an economic activity. Yet only certain aspects of the processing of this food 
are economic. Grinding corn or plucking chickens are market activities in the first world; in third world 
economies, this work with development. But cooking the food for the evening meal is something women 
in the first world generally do as part of their unpaid domestic labor. It would not, therefore, be considered 
an economic activity when performed by a woman in the third world, nor should its existence or conditions 
surrounding its performance be considered signs of an economy‟s underdevelopment. 
 
It is important to recognize that there are women in the first world who perform the kinds of subsistence 
activities I have described here, and that there are many third world women who perform none at all. This 
does not obviate the theoretical point I am making that definitions of economic activity are based on . rst 
world experience, but it does mean that care should be taken in analyzing the practical implications of this 
point. 
 
Production boundaries based on what I have called the “first world/third party” criterion are not universally 
applied, in any case. Poor rural women in the third world are likely to see even the growing of crops as 
part of their domestic responsibilities. Development agencies will generally consider subsistence 
agriculture an economic activity, as the SNA and definitions of the “economically active population” by the 
International Conference of Labor Statisticians demonstrate. The status of activities such as carrying 
water, building a house, grinding grain and collecting firewood, is much more tentative in practice; as 
Lourdes Benería points out, many countries do not consider such activities economic for purposes of their 
national accounts (1992: 1551). There is, however, little ambiguity about the exclusion of domestic 
activities mirroring the unpaid labor of women in the first world; such work remains explicitly excluded 





As many feminist critics of economics have pointed out, excluding unpaid domestic labor from the 
production boundary means that it will not be measured in surveys of economic activities, nor will it be 
considered in policy design and evaluation (see Elson 1989, 1991, 1992). The analysis presented above 
suggests that this critique must be developed further to address first world as well as masculinist bias in 
policy. If, as I argue, a first world/third party criterion operates to define economic activity for policy 
makers, then it is not surprising that policy targeting women‟s nonmarket work in the third world tends to 
focus only on domestic labor which is performed on the market on the first world, e.g. fuel or water 
collection, gardens or the raising of animals for home consumption. This is especially true when such 
policy is promulgated by international agencies such as the World Bank which are explicitly directed to 
address only “productive” or economic activities.10 While these activities are certainly worthy of attention 
and policies directed at them are likely to contribute to the improvement of women‟s well-being, such 
exclusive attention suggests that their inclusion is premised on the continued marginalization of other 
domestic activities such as child care and cooking from policy consideration. 
 
This analysis supports Himmelweit‟s point that nonmarket definitions of economic activity can effectively 
marginalize unpaid domestic labor even when they are developed for the purpose of inclusion. The third 
party criterion does this by asserting an indirect market standard for defining the production boundary, 
thereby marginalizing all forms of nonmarket work. The first world/third party criterion defines nonmarket 
activity in the third world as work only if it would have been dealt with on the market in the first world. This 
results in the inclusion of some of the unpaid domestic activity of rural women on grounds which reinforce 
the exclusion of work such as child care and the preparation of meals. The pattern of inconsistent use of 
nonmarket definitions of economic activity also shows that activities or aspects of activities deemed 
“personal” are likely to be excluded even when the logic of the definition requires their inclusion. 
 
It follows from this analysis that the danger of replicating the conditions of exclusion is always present, 
even among feminists working to develop alternatives to mainstream economics. For example, in her 
book Woman’s Role in Economic Development (often credited with launching the field of women and 
development), Ester Boserup analyzes at length women‟s market and subsistence activity, yet never 
includes unpaid domestic labor among women‟s productive activities. Boserup does discuss work such as 
food and fuel collection, the making of clothing and baskets for home use, and grinding grain (Boserup 
1970: 162–3), revealing an implicit . rst world/third party criterion for defining economic activity; according 
to Lourdes Benería, “[Boserup] saw these activities . . . mostly as subsistence production, not as 
domestic work” (Benería 1992: 1549). More recent work in the field is not exempt from this bias. Lise 
Østergaard‟s Gender and Development: A Practical Guide (1992) has no substantive analysis of unpaid 
domestic labor as an economic activity; the discussion of women‟s work is limited to employment in the 
market economy. While other overviews, such as Janet Momsen‟s Women and Development in the Third 
World (1991), incorporate such labor as a matter of course in their analyses of women‟s work, this is by 
no means a universal tendency. My analysis suggests the need to focus our attention on personal and 
third world experiences and how they are dealt with in economic theory in developing alternatives, while 
also guarding against essentialism. 
 
This is not easy to do and will probably require radical change in how we think about the economic. The 
concept “unpaid domestic labor,” for example, is itself a theoretical abstraction which excludes much of 
the work performed by third world women as part of their unpaid domestic responsibilities, largely 
because it is a concept constructed in opposition to “work” as experienced and de. ned in the . rst world. 
This concept requires us to treat subsistence and domestic labor as separate categories in third world 
contexts, even when they occur in the same household, are both unpaid, and are done by the same 
woman simultaneously. I have chosen to maintain the distinction between subsistence and domestic 
labor in order to emphasize the marginalization of the latter at all levels of economic analysis. 
This is a strategic, if problematic, move. By persisting in naming the domestic in the context of the third 






1 Waring considers some of the limitations of these alternatives, but not how they define economic 
activity. 
 
2 While it may seem obvious that a criterion for defining economic activity which is based on an indirect 
market standard marginalizes unpaid domestic labor nearly as effectively as a strict market criterion, it is 
not a point that has been incorporated widely in feminist analysis of economic theory and practice. 
 
3 This is a problem that Himmelweit considers also, though in another context (see Himmelweit 1995). 
 
4 It is not at all obvious to me that certain aspects of watching television, reading or other recreation 
should not be considered economic, but since unpaid domestic labor would not generally be understood 
to include such activities I will not pursue this argument here. Note that while Reid discusses at length her 
reasons for defining production as something which it must be possible to delegate, she moves directly 
from that argument to the third party criterion, with no comment at all on why it must be conceptually 
possible for the market to mediate the delegation (see Reid 1934: 6–11). Both aspects of this argument 
are problematic, but Reid is not alone in failing to recognize that they are two distinct assertions. 
 
5 The complaint that joint production is a problem in considering unpaid domestic labor an economic 
activity can lead to the exclusion of the personal on grounds similar to those Reid uses. In John Devereux 
and Luis Locay‟s evaluation childcare, such as playing with children, were . . . excluded” (Devereux and 
Locay 1992: 401), presumably because a major product of this activity is deemed the enjoyment the 
parent gains from such play. Nancy Folbre has pointed out that the issue of joint production is as relevant 
to market work as it is to unpaid domestic labor (see Folbre 1986). In any case, the joint production 
involved in such labor is certainly exaggerated in many cases – playing tea party or ball with a child may 
be torturous rather than pleasurable for the parent at least some of the time but cannot always be 
avoided. 
 
6 The Cold War origin of the terms “first” and “third” worlds, as well as the hierarchy implied and the 
homogeneity imposed on extremely diverse experiences, makes their use highly problematic. 
Nevertheless, I use them, primarily because the opposition between “third” and “first” world experiences 
shapes categories of analysis in development economics so completely that my deconstruction of 
production boundaries requires a highlighting of this opposition. At the same time, political resistance to 
domination by the North has been and, at least for now, continues to be organized on the basis of an 
“imagined community” of Southern peoples, as Chandra Mohanty has suggested (Mohanty 1991a: 4). I 
use the lower-case in preference to the more common upper-case to avoid transforming these terms into 
proper names which even further homogenize the diverse experiences of people in the South, a danger 
which has been pointed out repeatedly. For further discussion of the theoretical and political concerns at 
issue here, see Mohanty (1991a, 1991b). 
 
7 As Waring has argued, imputing a value to unpaid domestic labor in terms of prices contributes to the 
marginalization of such labor in economic analysis by legitimizing the market as the appropriate criterion 
for dfining production boundaries, but this does not obviate its usefulness as a political strategy (Waring 
1988: 285–7). 
 
8 Quoted in Benería (1992: 1549). 
 
9 Note that the first world/third party criterion can also be imposed through the definition of household 
production. For example, in her survey of studies of homemakers‟ use of time, Reid points out that 
“[h]omemaking as de.ned in these studies excludes all tasks connected with the home which are not 
commonly carried out by town women. Vegetable gardening, dairying, care of chickens have not been 
included even though the products were used by the family. Flower gardening is homemaking, but 
vegetable gardening is not. Picking peas is farm work but shelling peas is homemaking” (Reid 1934: 81, 
83). 
 
10 See Nüket Kardam‟s excellent analysis of the incorporation of women‟s issues in international 
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